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The present paper examines characteristics related to the two parties involved with hospital 
mergers and acquisitions and how these affect the location of the merger or acquisition. 
Using a dataset provided by Levin Associates, we study announcements of this 
phenomenon between 1997 and 2016. We find that private and publicly traded hospitals 
have been more engaged in interstate hospital M&As, as compared to nonprofit hospitals. 
We also find that nonprofit and publicly traded firms are increasing their rates of rural 
M&A activity over time. We offer areas for further research based on our literature review, 
the findings, and the changing dynamics of the hospital market. Our findings should be of 
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For the past several decades hospital and health system mergers and acquisitions 
(hereinafter hospital M&A or hospital M&As) have been ongoing and of interest to 
scholars (e.g. Wilke and Choi, 1988; Brooks and Jones, 1997; Schmitt, 2017). The financial 
economics and management literatures note that firms undertake M&As for a number of 
reasons including: increasing market share to raise prices or lower costs (Henderson, 1979), 
to integrate markets (Sawler, 2005), to acquire the reputation of a firm (Dranove and 
Shanley, 1995; Klein, Crawford, and Alchian, 1978), as a defensive measure (Haleblian, 
Devers, et al., 2009), or to acquire competencies or other resources that the acquiring firm 
lacks (Demirbag, Ng, and Tatoglu, 2007). In the healthcare literature, more specific 
additional reasons prompting hospital M&As include: to improve quality of services, 
broaden geographic footprint, as a response to regulatory pressures and the economic 
downturn, reduced demand for inpatient beds, and to maintain identity or mission 
(Alexander and Morrisey, 1988; Dranove and Shanley, 1995; Vogt and Town, 2006; 
Hayford, 2012; McCue, Thompson, and Kim, 2015; Schmitt, 2017). We know much of the 
supposed reasons (and their performance outcomes) for hospital M&As, but other than 
trade press announcements little about the characteristics (McCue, et al., 2015) and location 
of M&As, as most research has focused on performance aspects of the consolidated 
hospital. The present paper is concerned with characteristics related to the two parties 
involved in hospital M&As and how these affect the location of the merger or acquisition. 
A merger occurs when two firms of relatively the same size agree to go forward as 
a single new firm rather than remain separately owned and operated. The combination of 
Barnes Hospital with Jewish Hospital in St. Louis in 1996 is an example of a merger. An 
acquisition occurs when one firm takes over another firm and clearly establishes itself as 
the new owner. LifePoint Hospital Inc.’s purchase of Woods Memorial Hospital in 
Tennessee in 2012 is an example of an acquisition. For our study’s purposes, we do not 
distinguish between the two types of transactions, but study both types combined.  
Early studies based on hospital consolidation in the 1970s found hospital M&As to 
lead to higher prices and costs, with researchers attributing this to the “medical arms race” 
phenomenon where physicians “play” competing hospitals against one another to obtain 
medical technologies and other resources for their use (Cuellare and Gertler, 2003). Since 
the advent of Medicare’s Prospective Payment System in the 1980s, hospital consolidations 
have increased (Alexander, Halpern, and Lee, 1996) and have, perhaps, occurred in waves 
(Vogt, 2009; Advisory Board, 2013). The 1990s saw hospitals faced with the changing 
reimbursement landscape as managed care swept across the country (Park and Town, 
2014). In 2010, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA) was signed bringing 
with it additional requirements and potential cuts in payment. For example, under value 
based reimbursement schemes, hospitals may face Medicare cuts if they do not meet the 
prescribed technology and quality measures (Noles et al. 2015). The above factors affected 
all hospitals, further leading to both nonprofit and for-profit hospitals forming locally 
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concentrated health systems (Cuellar and Gertler, 2003) with approximately 60 percent of 
hospitals residing in health systems in the early 21st century (Cutler and Morton, 2013).  
Much of the hospital M&A literature focuses on local consolidation (Schmitt, 
2017). Yet many of the hospital M&As taking place recently involve hospitals that cover 
separate geographic service areas (Dafny, 2014) of which we know little (e.g. Harrison, 
McCue, and Wang, 2003). Additionally, most studies cover a short time frame such as one 
to four years. The present study examines all announced hospital M&As over the 20-year 
period occurring between 1997 and 2016. We are interested in knowing whether ownership 
characteristics affect the location of hospital M&As. In particular, we seek to explore the 
choice of location and the variation among for-profit, nonprofit, and private hospitals. We 
suggest that if variation exists between ownership types, then this may reflect different 
purposes for M&As by ownership structure. We conclude by offering areas for future 




Economic theory suggests that mergers and acquisitions have the potential to increase 
leverage over suppliers for the procurement of less expensive inputs and to increase 
efficiencies through economies of scale and scope (Krishnan and Krishnan, 2003). For this 
reason, two streams that dominate much of the literature on hospital M&As have focused 
on increasing local market share to (1) raise prices or (2) lower costs (Ho and Hamilton, 
2000; Noles et al., 2015). For example, Krishnan (2001) studying health system 
acquisitions in California and Ohio found that this had the tendency to raise prices. Cuellar 
and Gertler (2005) studying hospitals in systems compared with those not in systems found 
managed care and indemnity prices were higher for system hospitals compared with 
hospitals that were not in systems. Dafny, Ho, and Lee (2016) show that even cross-market 
mergers (i.e., hospital mergers across distinct geographic boundaries) can reduce 
competition and lead to higher prices. Lewis and Pflum (2017: 579) summarize much of 
this M&A-price literature when they state “[r]ecent empirical studies have consistently 
found that mergers between local rival hospitals result in significantly higher 
reimbursement rates.”  
Relative to hospital expenses or costs, in an early study of mergers between 1956 
and 1970, Treat (1976) finds that costs increase significantly after mergers compared with 
non-merged facilities for urban hospitals, but not for rural hospitals. Dranove and Shanley 
(1995) studying California hospitals in 1988 find that health systems are no better at 
exploiting economies of scale related to production, administration, and marketing than 
independent hospitals. Connor, Feldman, and Dowd (1998) find modest cost savings tend 
to quickly vanish in concentrated markets. In a review paper, Vogt and Town (2006) find 
mixed results but a slight indication that hospitals that consolidate facilities also lower costs 
(with it being noted that this cost savings may not be passed on to the payer). Harrison 
(2011) finds economies of scale for merged hospitals in the short term, but over time these 
efficiencies decrease. Schmitt (2017: 80) summarizes this M&A-cost literature when he 
notes, “[o]n balance, the evidence thus far fails to support strong claims of systematic cost 
savings from mergers.” 
 Because the hospital M&A literature has shown a lack of support for cost reduction, 
yet substantial support for price increases post merger there continues to be debate among 
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scholars about the appropriate level of antitrust enforcement. This is to say that some 
researchers are concerned as to whether or not antitrust laws are being enforced at an 
appropriate level in all markets. In a much-cited work by Lynk (1995), he shows that 
nonprofit hospital prices in California are less than for-profit hospital prices. The 
suggestion here is that nonprofit mergers would not result in increased prices. Numerous 
researchers have challenged this position and questioned the appropriateness of mergers in 
certain markets (e.g. Vita and Sacher, 2001; Conners, 2003; Tenn, 2011). This debate 
continues a literature stream with suggestions for revisions to guidelines and a 
strengthening of enforcement. 
Another stream in the hospital M&A literature focuses on firm financial 
performance post acquisition. For example, a study in the 1980s for Modern Healthcare of 
36 hospitals that merged into 18 hospitals found improved financial profitability 2 years 
after the merger (Harris, Ozgena and Ozcan, 2000). Whereas, Mullner and Andersen 
(1987) studying 32 hospital mergers during a similar time period (i.e., early 1980s) did not 
find any significant results attributable to the mergers. Clement et al. (1997) studying 
strategic hospital alliances (including but not limited to hospital M&As) found hospitals in 
alliances had higher operating cash flow per bed than the hospitals that were not in strategic 
alliances. While McCue et al. (2015) found the cash flow margin of acquired hospitals 
being lower than a comparison group of non-acquired hospitals. A study by Deloitte (2013) 
of hospital acquisitions in 2007 and 2008 found the financial performance of acquired firms 
improved after the acquisition, however, remained below their peers. Noles et al. (2015) 
studying rural hospitals found that mergers and acquisitions did not result in more capital, 
debt relief, or an improvement in profitability. In summary, results from studies on hospital 
M&As and financial performance, like the M&A market for all industries (Cartwright and 
Schoenberg, 2006), remains mixed at best. 
A fifth stream focuses on the quality of care after the merger. For example, Hayford 
(2012) found hospital mergers to be associated with greater treatment intensity. Kessler 
and McClellan (2000) found that hospitals in more competitive environments have lower 
incidences of adverse health events. Studying one hospital merger in Chicago, Romano 
and Balan (2011) found little evidence that the merger improved quality. Though there is 
some literature exploring the consequences on patient outcomes, there is much research 
needed in this area before conclusions can be drawn (Ho and Hamilton, 2000; Hayford, 
2012).  
Another stream examines the price paid for the acquired hospital. Much of this 
research focuses on the sale of nonprofit hospitals to for-profit entities. Cutler and 
Horowitz (2000) note that between 1970 and 1995, about 7 percent of the not-for-profit 
hospitals in the U.S. had converted to for-profit corporate status. McCue and Furst (1986) 
studying acquired and non-acquired firms in the South from 1978 through 1982 found that 
investor-owned systems were typically acquiring financially distressed hospitals. Sloan, 
Ostermann, and Conover (2003) examining changes in ownership status from 1986 through 
1995 found similar results. McCue, McCue, and Wheeler (1988) studying hospital 
acquisitions by investor-owned systems from 1978 through 1984 found that these systems 
were willing to pay higher prices for more highly utilized hospitals in high-income areas, 
but less for older hospitals that might require capital improvements. Leone, Van Horn, and 
Wedig (2005) studying hospital acquisition prices between 1990 and 2001 found no 
difference in market prices paid by investor-owned chains in their purchase of for-profit 
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and nonprofit facilities. McCue and Kim (2009) studying hospital acquisitions between 
1999 and 2001 found acquiring hospital systems paid a higher price for facilities located 
between urban and rural markets; yet, no significant difference in acquisition price between 
for-profit and nonprofit hospitals. 
As shown above, much of the hospital M&A literature has focused on some aspect 
of performance outcome (price, cost, financial or quality) within a specified market or 
between comparison groups or mergers specific to investor-owned entities. Little is known 
about out-of-market hospital acquisitions (Lewis and Pflum, 2017) or the characteristics 
that may play a role in determining in-state or out-of-state hospital acquisitions. The 
present study seeks to address determinants of location of hospital mergers and 
acquisitions. Specifically, we postulate that the ownership structure of both the selling and 
acquiring firms affect hospital acquisitions occurring within or without a state and 
geographic demographics (i.e., rural/mostly rural/urban). We choose to study M&As at the 
state level as hospitals are mainly regulated (e.g. license, certificate of need) at this level. 
Additionally, much of the M&A literature has focused on price, especially price of services 
acquired by commercial insurance. Commercial insurance has historically been regulated 
at the state level, and thus, commercial insurers create provider networks for individuals 
and employers primarily at the state level. 
Figure 1 depicts the hospital M&A announcements from 1997 through 2016 
derived from data from Irving Levin and Associates. From Figure 1, one can see that M&A 
announcements declined after the 1990s, but increased again after 2010 (perhaps, in 
response to the ACA).  
 










































































In a synthesis paper for the Robert Woods Johnson Foundation, Vogt and Towns 
(2006) found that for a person living in a metropolitan statistical area their choice of 
hospitals decreased from six to four based on an increase in the Herfindahl Hirschman 
Index between 1990 and 2003. Vogt and Towns (2006) found this consolidation to be 
greatest in the South. We examine announced hospital M&As between 1997 and 2016. 
Figure 2 shows the percentage of hospital M&A announcements by region of the country 
over time. From Figure 2, one can see that during the period under study the area of the 




Keeler, Melnick, and Zwanziger (1999) find that nonprofit hospital mergers lead to 
higher prices, and that the price increases resulting from nonprofit mergers are increasing 
over time. In a similar study, Melnick, Keeler, and Zwanziger (1999) note that the majority 
of hospital acquisitions from 1994 to 1997 were made by nonprofit hospitals. They perform 
simulation models on hypothetical mergers of both nonprofit hospitals and for-profit 
hospitals. They (Melnick et al. 1999) find that mergers that consolidate markets lead to 
price increases at both merging hospitals and competitors regardless of ownership status. 
Related to price increases, Berenson (2015: 722) notes “[m]arket power might not have 
been the primary motivation for the merger but can easily become the result—and persist 
for years to come.”  













Note: Percent calculated as (# of announcements for the region)/(# 
announcements for the year) 
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Given the effect of consolidation on price, there remains debate among 
academicians and policy makers as to whether the M&A activity of nonprofits has led or 
would lead to a change in culture and purpose (Sloan, 2000; Sloan et al., 2003). This is to 
say that debate remains as to whether or not nonprofit hospitals have become more attuned 
to the profit motive and less community focused than in years past. Similarly, for-profit 
firms have acquired nonprofit firms and converted the acquired firms to for-profit status 
(Sloan, 2000), raising concerns about community benefits (Picone, Chou, and Sloan, 
2002). Table 1 shows hospital M&A announcements by ownership status. Similar to 
Melnick, et al. (1999), the study finds nonprofits as the largest acquirers of other hospitals 
in terms of transactions and beds, with the transactions of nonprofits merging or acquiring 
other nonprofits being the largest category. 










Nonprofit All 898               216,262  $131,315 
 Nonprofit 709               179,766  $114,736 
 Private 69                 10,416  $6,484 
 Publicly Traded 120                 26,080  $10,095 
Private All 272                 73,261  $35,456 
 Nonprofit 137                 33,362  $17,741 
 Private 60                 16,450  $8,473 
 Publicly Traded 75                 23,449  $9,242 
Publicly Traded All 264                 66,507  $31,224 
 Nonprofit 172                 39,459  $18,584 
 Private 50                 13,572  $8,091 
 Publicly Traded 42                 13,476  $4,548 




Mark (1999), on the other hand, found an improvement in financial performance 
following hospital conversions from nonprofit to for-profit status and suggests that this 
may be a benefit to the community, as many hospital M&As are prompted by financial 
distress (McCue and Furst, 1986). This may be because M&As in some settings are often 
an alternative option to hospital closure (Sinay, 1998). Furthermore, Cutler and Horowitz 
(2000) note that nonprofits often follow for-profit hospitals’ behavior such as exploiting 
Medicare loopholes. Sloan et al. (2003) studying hospital M&As from 1986 through 1996 
found that the most common change of ownership was from public to private (33.4 
percent), followed by public to for-profit (28 percent). Table 2 shows change in ownership 
status by 5-year groupings. As can be seen during these periods, there was no change in 
ownership status between 43.9 percent and 66.7 percent of the time. The 5-year period of 
2002 through 2006 saw the greatest change of ownership status with about 56 percent of 
the announcements. For those firms that did change ownership status, there was great 
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variation during the time periods. For example, hospitals that changed from nonprofit status 
to private ranged from about 3 percent to about 22 percent of the announcements depending 
on the 5-year period. 
 
Table 2 Percentage Change in Ownership Grouping by Year 
 
 
Note: Grey brings out larger changes in ownership status. N= 1,434 
Much of the M&A literature assumes little difference among hospitals (Alexander 
and Morrisey, 1988; Sloan et al. 2003). Alexander and Morrisey (1988: 161) note that 
systems “may employ, as part of their corporate strategy, acquisition criteria that direct 
them to market themselves in particular geographic areas and/or to hospitals possessing 
specific, predefined characteristics.” An area that has not been examined in the academic 
literature is characteristics related to who the seller and acquirer are in different settings. 
Alexander and Morrisey (1988) begin to answer this question, but it has been nearly 30 
years since this study, and the landscape for M&As, perhaps, has changed.  
Given the above, we suggest that there may be different purposes for hospitals 
engaging in M&As based on geographic location. Most of the literature focuses on within 
market consolidation, with hospitals supposedly seeking economic efficiencies. Alexander 
and Morrisey (1998) note that there are other reasons for M&As, such as survival of 
mission. For example, the “graying” of Catholic religious persons has led to the 
consolidation of Catholic hospitals. Alexander and Morrisey (1988) imply that private, 
religious organizations may wish to keep their mission ongoing despite the need for 
consolidation, with many of these organizations residing across state boarders. 
Additionally, publicly traded firms tend to acquire financially distressed hospitals 
regardless of location, seeking to lower costs and discard unprofitable units within the 
facility. As Robinson (1996: 158) notes “horizontal expansion or mergers across different 
local markets can achieve efficiencies through spreading administrative overhead expenses 
and by volume purchases of suppliers…economic theory views across-market expansion 
as conducive to competition and efficiency.” Thus, we hypothesize: 
 
H1 Private and publicly traded hospitals are more likely to engage in M&As of 
hospitals residing outside of the state compared to nonprofit hospitals. 
 
1997-2001 2002-2006 2007-2011 2012-2016
No change 66.68% 43.96% 48.40% 66.57%
Private to Nonprofit 2.37% 0.74% 6.54% 2.77%
Publicly Traded to Nonprofit 9.47% 7.98% 6.18% 4.17%
Nonprofit to Private 2.96% 10.86% 21.83% 8.88%
Publicly Traded to Private 5.37% 15.65% 4.45% 2.88%
Nonprofit to Publicly Traded 11.22% 19.62% 8.69% 5.80%
Private to Publicly Traded 1.94% 1.21% 3.92% 8.94%
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 Distinctions can also be made for firms engaged in urban and rural M&As. Sinay 
(1998) notes there are two distinctions between the creation of rural hospital system 
development and others: (1) geographic distance between hospitals; and (2) the need for 
rural hospitals to gain access to managed care contracts, especially within the managed 
Medicaid market. Berenson (2015) observes that rural hospitals have a monopoly like 
power based on distance between hospitals. National hospital organizations, regardless of 
ownership status, often times have national insurance contracts allowing rural hospitals 
access to commercial managed care contracts in which they might otherwise not have 
access (Berenson et al., 2012). Many rural hospitals also are critical access hospitals 
(CAH), which have special status with Medicare. CAH hospitals receive cost based 
reimbursement from Medicare, with the owner’s administrative costs being covered at a 
greater rate than in a prospective reimbursement system (Stensland, Davidson, and 
Moscovice, 2004). Similar to the Medicare loopholes mentioned above (e.g. Cutler and 
Horowitz, 2000), national firms may be more aware of how to apply advantages learned in 
one market to other markets. Thus, we hypothesize:  
 
H2: Private and publicly traded hospitals are more likely to engage in M&As of 




We use a database from Irving Levin Associates, which is widely used in the hospital M&A 
literature (e.g. McCue and Kim, 2005; Noles et al. 2015; Schmitt, 2017). The database 
includes announcements of all hospital M&As occurring in the U.S. We use data from the 
20-year period of 1997 through 2016. There were 1,797 announcements of which 1,434 
(79.8 percent) had usable data. As the announcements are about both actual M&As and the 
intention to merge or acquire, we take a sample of the population of announcements (i.e., 
from 2010-2016) and perform an Internet search to verify that the M&A actually occurred. 
We were able to verify 467 out of 490 (or 94.0 percent) announcements occurred. We do 
not check to see if the M&A did not occur. Our inability to verify this does not necessarily 
imply that the M&A did not occur, but rather that we were not able to confirm via an 
Internet search. We run a t-test based on number of beds and revenue to determine 
differences in the population and the sample and found non-significant results (p= 0.63; 
p=0.29). As there is no statistical difference, we use the entire announcement set from 
Irving Levin Associates that had usable data (N=1,434). 
The dataset includes the city, state, and zip code for both sellers and acquirers. 
Additional work was done to code the dependent variable for in-state and out-of-state 
acquisitions. If a selling firm and acquiring firm are within the same state, the 
announcement was coded as one (1), if not it was coded as zero (0). Other control variables 
include a continuous variable for the date of the announcement, a continuous variable for 
the total revenue for the selling hospital(s), and a continuous variable for the number of 
inpatient beds of the selling hospital. Both of the variables for total revenue and number of 
inpatient beds are log transformed to assist with non-normality issues. Additional work was 
also done to control for the target hospital being a rural facility. The U.S. Census Bureau’s 
2010 list of counties was used to determine rural or urban status. Using the U.S. Census 
Bureau’s division of rural/mostly rural/urban, we found 19.6% of M&As involved rural or 
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mostly rural hospitals. We combine the mostly rural designation into the rural variable. The 
independent variables include controls describing the ownership type of the selling hospital 
(i.e., Nonprofit; Private; Publicly traded) and the acquiring hospital (i.e., Nonprofit; 
Private; Publicly traded).  Finally, the dataset controls for the geographic region in which 
the target facility is located in the same manner that previous work has done (e.g. Furukawa 




A logistic regression was employed to test the effects of the acquirer’s ownership status on 
purchasing hospitals outside of the buyer’s state (H1). The regression included 1,434 
announcements (37.4% of which were outside the acquirer’s state). The overall model was 
significant (p<0.001) and explains approximately 36.86 percent of the variance in the target 
(i.e., purchasing hospitals outside of the buyer’s state). Control variables included the 
region in which the target hospital was located, whether the target hospital was rural, 
logged revenue and logged beds of the target hospital, and the ownership status of the target 
hospital (see Table 3).  
The regression supports hypothesis 1. Table 3 shows that private and publicly 
traded organizations were 17 and 46 times (respectively) more likely to engage in out-of-
state M&A than were nonprofit organizations (p<0.001). Further interesting findings 
included rural hospitals were more likely to be targets of out-of-state M&A activities than 
were urban hospitals. Some regional differences in out-of-state M&As are visible in the 
dataset. 
 
Table 3 Logistic Regression of Acquirer Ownership Status on Out-of-State M&A 
 MLE p Odds Ratio 
Intercept -6.0390 0.001  
DateContiguous -0.0034 0.810 0.997 
LNRevenue 0.1727 0.204 1.189 
LNBeds 0.1862 0.237 1.205 
Target Region*    
   Mountain 1.0604 0.005 2.888 
   North Central 0.4350 0.072 1.545 
   North East -0.2339 0.363 0.791 
   Pacific -0.5882 0.059 0.555 
   South Central 0.1469 0.539 1.158 
Target is Rural 0.6255 0.003 1.869 
Target is Private -0.4071 0.080 0.666 
Target is Publicly Traded -0.3273 0.123 0.721 
Acquirer is Private 2.8439 <.001 17.183 
Acquirer is Publicly Traded 3.8242 <.001 45.794 
Note: n = 1434 announcements. 898 were outside the acquirer's 




Logistic regression was also used to test the effects of the acquirer’s ownership 
status on purchasing rural hospitals (H2). The regression used the same sample, with 19.6% 
of the announcements including rural targets. Table 4 shows that the overall model 
significantly (p<0.001) explains approximately 27.55 percent of the variance around 
whether the announcements were for rural or non-rural purchases. Control variables 
included the region in which the target hospital was located, logged revenue and logged 
beds of the target hospital, and the ownership status of the target hospital.  
The regression does not show support for hypothesis 2. It appears that privately 
held organizations are less likely to engage in M&A activities with rural hospitals than are 
nonprofit organizations. Further, we cannot say that publicly traded organizations are any 
more or less likely to engage in M&A activities with rural hospitals than are nonprofit 
organizations. Estimates related to other control variables reveal that the percent of M&A 
activity related to targeting rural hospitals is increasing over time. Further, estimates related 
to revenue and beds appear to have logical relationships (i.e., smaller hospitals are more 
likely to be rural). 
 
Table 4 Logistic Regression of Acquirer Ownership Status on Rural Purchases 
 MLE p Odds Ratio 
Intercept 20.2504 <.001  
DateContiguous 0.0726 <.001 1.075 
LNRevenue -1.0479 <.001 0.351 
LNBeds -0.6068 <.001 0.545 
Target Region*    
   Mountain -1.8184 <.001 0.162 
   North Central -1.2005 <.001 0.301 
   North East -1.1988 <.001 0.302 
   Pacific -2.3628 <.001 0.094 
   South Central -0.5394 0.022 0.583 
Target is Private -1.0575 <.001 0.347 
Target is Publicly Traded -0.6002 0.014 0.549 
Acquirer is Private -0.8500 0.001 0.427 
Acquirer is Publicly Traded 0.0103 0.962 1.010 
Note: n = 1434 announcements. 281 were rural or mostly rural. 
*South East is the reference region 
 
 
The unexpected findings from the test of H2 justified a follow up analysis. This 
dataset provides the opportunity to test whether the percent of M&A activity with rural 
facilities is changing over time for each of the types of acquiring firms (nonprofit, publicly 
traded, and private). The logistic regression in Table 5 allows tests of differences in the 
change of the percent of rural M&A activities across different types of acquiring firms. 
Recognizing there are many ways to set up this regression, the form in Table 5 provides 
the simplest interpretation. Different forms (such as retaining the ContiguousDate variable 
separately) provide the same conclusions (results not shown). 
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Results in Table 5 show that the percent of M&A activity related to rural facilities 
is increasing for nonprofit and publicly traded firms (p<0.001 and p=0.008 respectively). 
Though the estimate for private firms is negative, it is not significantly different from zero. 
Further, linear combinations of the three estimates were run in three post-estimation tests. 
Nonprofit and publicly traded firms both had significantly higher rates of increase over 20 
years than did private firms (p<0.001 and p=0.005 respectively). The rates of increase for 
publicly traded firms and nonprofit firms were not significantly different from one another 
(p=0.798). 
 
Table 5 Logistic Regression of Changes in the relationship of Acquirer Ownership Status 
on Rural Purchases over time 
 MLE p Odds Ratio 
Intercept 20.5734 <.001  
LNRevenue -1.0996 <.001 0.333 
LNBeds -0.5463 0.002 0.579 
Target Region*    
   Mountain -1.9197 <.001 0.147 
   North Central -1.2095 <.001 0.298 
   North East -1.2225 <.001 0.294 
   Pacific -2.4004 <.001 0.091 
   South Central -0.5926 0.013 0.553 
Target is Private -0.9673 <.001 0.38 
Target is Publicly Traded -0.6600 0.008 0.517 
Acquirer is Private 0.6895 0.145 1.993 
Acquirer is Publicly Traded 0.1141 0.778 1.121 
ACQ_NFP_DC 0.0960 <.001 1.101 
ACQ_PRI_DC -0.0479 0.195 0.953 
ACQ_PUB_DC 0.0872 0.008 1.091 
Note: n = 1434 announcements. 281 were rural or mostly rural. 




The results provide unexpected and interesting findings for discussion. Hypothesis 
1 that publicly traded and private firms were more likely to engage in out-of-state M&A 
activities was supported. Hypothesis 2 that nonprofit firms were more likely to engage in 
rural M&A activities is not supported. Further analysis suggests that nonprofit and publicly 









Discussion, areas for further research, and limitations  
 
The present study has sought to examine the characteristics related to hospital M&As and 
how these affect the location of the merger or acquisition. The study contributes to the 
hospital M&A literature by verifying that much of the activity in the multi-state hospital 
M&A market over the past 20 years has been by private and publicly traded firms, as 
compared to nonprofit hospitals. This suggests that over the past 20 years private and 
publicly traded firms may have had different reasons for M&A expansion than nonprofit 
hospitals. In other words, nonprofit firms’ reasons for M&A have been more localized than 
private and publicly traded firms. It also suggests that nonprofit hospitals have been more 
involved with localized market consolidation than other types of hospitals. 
  Our results also confirm that there is a recent trend of localized nonprofit health 
systems seeking to expand their reach into statewide systems in a return to the “hub-and-
spoke” model (Kacik, 2017). This may be because many urban, metropolitan markets have 
been at least in part consolidated or as Berenson (2015: 725) notes, “the horse has already 
left the barn.” For example our study found that 20.7 percent of all acquirers were single 
hospitals in 1997. In 2016, this number had changed to 10.0 percent. According to the 
American Hospital Association (2017) there were 4,862 total community hospitals in the 
U.S. in 2015. There were 1,829 rural hospitals and 3,033 urban hospitals. Of these hospitals 
3,198 (or 66 percent) were in a system (AHA, 2017). Perhaps what these trends and our 
findings suggest is that there are both national systems that are more private or publicly 
traded in nature and an increasingly burgeoning development of nonprofit state-wide 
systems. Our finding is different than in years past where rural hospitals mainly were 
reported as being acquired by either private or publicly traded firms.  
  More recently, hospital M&As are on pace in 2017 to exceed those in 2016 (Kacik, 
2017). It has been noted that many national health systems, regardless of ownership status, 
are recently in retreat from M&A activity (Barkholz, 2017). This is presumably due to the 
large debt burden many of these systems have undertaken as part of the most recent wave 
of M&As. Yet this is not the case for all as mega-mergers between health systems continue 
(Evans and Mathews, 2017). Thus, we may expect to see further hospital consolidation at 
both the state and national levels. Given this changing environment, we outline where we 
believe additional research is needed based on our findings and a review of the literature. 
Due the preponderance in the literature on price increases, debate remains 
related to the efficacy of hospital mergers and acquisitions. Melnick et al. (1999) found 
that mergers that consolidate markets lead to price increases regardless of ownership status. 
We do not know if hospital M&As by private or publicly traded firms lead to higher prices 
compared to hospital prices of nonprofit hospitals in non-consolidated or non-localized 
markets (i.e., if a publicly traded firm acquires a rural hospital does it increase its prices 
for similar services relative to nonprofit hospitals within state in a urban market 
consolidated by nonprofit hospitals). Similarly, as nonprofits expand into rural markets are 
they able to raise rural hospital commercial prices? We do not know but suspect that 
Dranove and Shanley’s 1995 statement, perhaps, remains relevant: “even when 
economies of scale and scope are present in a production or retail process, it is not 
always necessary for firms to combine under common ownership to achieve 
them…For example, firms can achieve purchasing economies by joint purchasing 
without any ownership change.” (Dranove and Shanley, 1995: 55). It also would be 
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valuable to further examine performance factors of hospitals in alternative structures 
(e.g. joint ventures, under management contracts) compared with hospitals in wholly 
owned health systems.  
As mentioned in the literature review, there is a paucity of research on the effects 
of hospital M&As on quality. Likewise, there is a scarcity of research examining hospital 
M&As and access to providers. We do not know the extent to which providers reduce, 
combine, or eliminate services (or the kinds of services) post acquisition. From an 
operational efficiency perspective, one may assume that organizations would seek to 
combine some services. Likewise, other than trade press announcements, we do not know 
if M&As led to the expansion of services. For example, when a tertiary facility acquires a 
rural primary hospital does the tertiary hospital send physicians to the rural hospital to 
perform outpatient procedures? Does the use of tele-health technology increase between 
merging hospitals? 
Additionally, the majority of research has examined the acquired hospital. We do 
not know much about the acquiring hospital post acquisition. For example, we do not know 
the financial effects on the acquiring hospital post M&A. Most strategic management 
research on M&As is interested in the effect M&As have on the surviving or acquiring 
firm. Yet, we know of no study that specifically examines the acquiring firm’s financial 
status post acquisition. Nor do we know the effects of quality on an acquiring firm. One 
could assume that an acquiring firm may also learn from an acquired firm.  
There is also little research on the various performance outcomes across markets. 
This is to ask if systems engaged in hospital M&As in certain states or markets (e.g. rural, 
urban) perform better across performance outcome dimensions (e.g. quality, costs, cash-
flow, profitability).  
There is also little research on the effect of hospital M&As on buyers and suppliers. 
Berenson (2015) notes that the insurance market is even more concentrated in most markets 
than the hospital market. Other than studies on price of hospital services, there is little 
direct empirical work on the effects that hospital M&As may have on buyers in a particular 
market (i.e., how has hospital M&As led to insurance market consolidation, or vice versa). 
Additionally, there is much pre-acquisition discussion in the trade press about the 
consolidation of suppliers or vendors, but little empirical work or case studies on how 
consolidated hospitals used their combined leverage to reduce supply costs. Similarly, how 
do consolidated hospitals deal with combining health records (i.e., how do merging 
hospitals deals with consolidating health information [and other] systems). 
During the time of our study there has also been much activity with the acquisition 
of physician practices and the employment by hospitals of physicians. Yet, we know little 
of how hospital M&As have affected this (i.e., has hospital M&As reduced the effect of 
the medical arms race—are physicians less able to “play” one hospital against another in 
order to acquire the services and equipment they request). We also do not know how 
hospital M&As affect referral patterns in consolidated markets. These and many other 
questions related to hospital M&As remain unanswered. 
The study is not without limitations. Although the manuscript controls for the 
number of beds and revenue of the acquired hospitals, it does not control for the number 
of hospitals (or their specific location) in each transaction. This is to say that many of the 
transactions had multiple hospitals. The study uses the data specified by Levin and 
Associates to determine location. For private hospitals, the study does not distinguish 
 
 15 
between private for-profit and private nonprofit hospitals. Our initial review of the data 
suggests that all for-profit hospitals are included in the publicly traded category. We did 
not control for the size of the acquiring hospital. We have studied announcements and are 
not certain that all announcements of hospital mergers and acquisitions were consummated, 
per our discussion in the Methods section. 
In conclusion, the present study has sought to examine the characteristics related to 
hospital M&As and how these affect the location of the merger or acquisition 
announcement. We find that private and publicly traded hospitals have been more engaged 
in interstate hospital M&As, as compared to nonprofit hospitals. We also find that nonprofit 
and publicly traded firms are increasing their rates of rural M&A activity over time. We 
offer areas for further research based on our literature review, the findings, and the 
changing dynamics of the hospital market. Our findings should be of interest to researchers, 
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